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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
Introduction 
The purpose of this research was to seek evidence regarding the 
validity of certain predictions that can be derived using the Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) (hereafter J-M) agency theory framework. In their model, 
auditing plays a specific role in determining.the value of the firm. 
The current study investigated this role and identified a situation 
which, if the J-M model is correct, should lead to a decrease in the 
stock price of a specific group of firms. Tests were conducted to 
determine the consistency of the predicted market reaction with observed 
phenomena. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the agency theory analysis 
... integrates elements from the theory of agency, the 
theory of property rights and the theory of finance to 
develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. 
We define the concept of agency costs, show its relation-
ship to the 'separation and control' issue, investigate 
the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence 
of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears these 
costs and why, and investigate the Pareto optimality of 
their existence. We also provide a new definition of the 
firm, and show how our analysis of the factors influencing 
the creation and issuance of debt and equity claims is a 
special case of the supply side of t.he completeness of 
markets problem (p. 305). 
Identifying further contributions of their analysis, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) state 
1 
Our theory helps explain: 
1. why an entrepreneur or manager in a firm ..• will 
choose a set of activities for the firm such that the 
total value of the firm is less then it would be if 
he were the sole owner • • -.~-
6. why accounting reports would be provided voluntarily 
to creditors and stockholders, and why independent 
auditors would be engaged by management to testify to 
the accuracy and correctness of such reports (emphasis 
added) (p. 306). 
2 
Briefly summarizing their analysis, agency costs are created because 
(1) managers and owners of companies are often different individuals, 
(2) owners are unable to observe all of the actions of the managers, and 
(3) because of the inability of owners to observe the managers' actions 
managers will deviate from the actions that will maximize the owners' 
beneficial interest in the firm. Agency costs are the financial effects 
of the nonoptimal managerial behavior. J-M posit that owners expect 
nonoptimal behavior on the part of management, estimate the effects of 
the divergent behavior, and penalize management accordingly. In other 
words, the managers bear the effects of their behavior. Therefore, 
managers have incentives to promise not to engage in nonoptimal 
behavior. The managers offer financial statements as a device by which 
owners can monitor management's activities. Owners recognize that 
they are unable to observe the preparation of the financial statements, 
and that managers would be able to issue false and misleading financial 
statements. Owners would therefore require that the financial 
statements be audited by independent auditors in order to obtain 
assurance as to the fairness of the statements. Owners are hypothesized 
to estimate the ability of the audited financial statements to act as 
an effective deterrent to certain aberrant managerial behavior. The 
presumption is that audited financial statements can lead to an 
increase in the market value of the firm over what it would be without 
such statements. 
The J-M analysis posits a direct relationship between the ability 
of an audit to limit a manager's aberrant activities and the market 
value of the firm. Stockholders (and potential stockholders) are 
thought to estimate the audit's limiting ability. This estimate is 
based in part on the specific auditor's past performance. The impli-
cation is that a change in expected auditor performance will lead to a 
change in the market value of a firm. This implication of the J-M 
agency theory model was the point of interest in this research. 
Specifically, if an event can be identified which can be expected to 
cause a change in the estimated value of an auditor's monitoring 
ability, a change in the market value of firms employing this auditor 
should be in evidence about the time of the signaling event. 
In order to select an event that signals a decrease in auditor 
performance, some expectations model must be employed to determine an 
anticipated auditor performance level. DeAngelo (1981) showed that 
audit firm size can be used as a surrogate for audit firm quality. 
The basic premise of DeAngelo's analysis was that since large firms 
have more clients, if they are caught "cheating" on.any one audit 
they are exposed to a greater potential loss in revenues than are 
smaller audit firms with fewer clients. The amount of the expected 
gain from cheating on an audit may be the same for both the small and 
large audit firms, but the potential loss from such actions is much 
more likely to off set the gain for large audit firms than it is for 
small audit firms. Therefore, since the large audit firm has less 
incentive to cheat than does a small audit firm, size of the firm can 
3 
be used as a substitute variable for expected audit quality. The 
DeAngelo auditor performance expectation model was employed in this 
research. 
The event chosen as the signal of interest in this research was 
the July 2, 1975 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sanction 
against Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company (PMM). PMM was one of the 
"Big 8" accounting firms and one of the largest auditing firms in the 
world. Using the DeAngelo expectations model, PMM was expected to 
provide a high level of audit performance. The SEC sanction served 
as a signal that the level of audit performance by PMM was less than 
expected. In reference to the SEC sanction, the Wall Street Journal 
(WSJ) (July 3, 1975) reported: 
The Securities and Exchange Commission announced a settlement 
with Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. that bars the big 
accounting firm from accepting most new, publicly held 
clients for six months. 
The sanction involving 'controversies' along with a 
lengthy critique of the firms' auditing practices, also 
released yesterday, is believed to be the harshest 
treatment ever imposed by the SEC on a major accounting 
firm. 
The controversies cited by the SEC involve Peat Marwick's 
role in auditing the financial statements of five clients 
that all experienced dramatic-and to many investors, 
shocking--financial collapses or profit restrictions. 
These are: 
Penn Central Co. and Sterling Homes Corp., both in 
bankruptcy proceedings; National Student Marketing 
Corp.; Talley Industries, Inc., and Republic National 
Life Insurance Co. 
. • . the commission's 177-page opinion and orde_r against 
Peat Marwick portrays an accounting concern that was 
operating somewhat less than competently and professionally 
(p. 3). 
The report noted that the sanction was "the harshest treatment" iI!lposed 
on a major CPA firm and that the firm "was operating somewhat less 
4 
than competently and professionally." Public notice of this sanction 
provided the signal of interest for the current research. 
Individual law suits against auditing firms were not viewed as 
appropriate signals for this research due to the problem of identifying 
the critical point in time around which to anticipate a stock price 
reaction. In the eyes of the law, a person (firm) is assumed innocent 
until proven guilty. But when is the firm ajudged guilty by the 
investing public? Should a stock price reaction occur when a suit is 
filed, when a suit is settled, or at some time in between? The timing 
problem posed by legal suits is extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to resolve. 
The SEC sanction of PMM was believed to be an event that provided 
5 
a strong signal to investors at the time of occurrence. The SEC practice 
was to conduct private disciplinary proceedings against professionals 
under investigation by the SEC. During 1974 and early 1975, the SEC 
was considering making public all disciplinary proceedings involving 
professionals who practice before the SEC. In March 1975, the SEC 
dropped its proposal for public discplinary proceedings. This action 
followed objections filed by various professional organizations which 
contended that even if a professional were found innocent of any 
wrongdoing, the resulting publicity could seriously impair the profes-
sional' s practice. The privacy of the SEC investigations helps to 
eliminate at least part of the timing problem that exists with public 
legal proceedings. For this reason, the SEC sanction was used as the 
signal in this research. 
Statement of Hypothesis 
The topic of interest in this research was the relationship between 
firm market value and an auditor's expected performance. The agency 
theory analysis implies that a change in the expected performance of 
an auditor will be reflected by a change in the market value of the 
firm. The SEC sanction of PMM was the event selected as a signal 
leading to a revision of expectations regarding PMM's audit performance. 
The sanction was posited to signal a lower level of performance than was 
previously expected. The J-M analysis allowed the prediction of a stock 
price decrease (and a diminished rate of return) following the SEC 
sanction. The methodology employed to test for the predicted stock 
price rea~tion was a variation of the difference in stock returns 
methodology and is detailed in Chapter III. Two portfolios, one 
containing PMM client firms and one containing nonPMM client firms, 
were constructed and the differences in the two portfolio returns were 
used to test the following hypotheses: 
The difference between the PMM client portfolio return 
and the nonPMM client portfolio return calculated 
during the week surrounding the SEC sanction was less 
than or equal to the mean difference in the portfolios' 
returns during nonevent weeks. 
The difference bewteen the PMM client portfolio return 
and the nonPMM client portfolio return calculated 
during the week surrounding the SEC sanction was greater 
than the mean difference in the portfolios' returns 
during nonevent weeks. 
Contribution and Limitations of the Research 
Agency theory is purported to be an explanatory model. The J-M 
quote on page 1 stated that the theory explains why activities occur. 
Agency theory is frequently used to explain the motivation behind an 
6 
individual's behavior. The primary justification for this research was 
to provide evidence which will be useful in assessing the reliability 
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of the J-M agency theory model as a tool of analysis. The observed 
market reaction to new information regarding the PMM auditing performance 
provided evidence of the consistency between the agency theory generated 
hypothesis and observed phenomena. The results of this empirical 
investigation raise serious doubts about the propriety of using the 
J-M agency theory framework to explain the motivational factors under-
lying auditor behavior. 
A potential limitation of this research lies in the fact that the 
research, by necessity, was a market study. The agency theory analysis 
presented was a partial equilibrium analysis. All factors other than 
the perceived qualit~ of the audit were held constant in the analysis. 
Observed market prices are based upon a multitude of factors, any 
number of which change from day to day. The research methodology 
employed in this study was specifically designed to attempt to control 
for the effects of all factors influencing the market price of stocks 
that are independent of the firm's auditor. The reliability of the 
results of this research is only as good as the ability of the research 
design to control for the effects of other facto.rs unrelated to infor-
mation regarding audit quality. 
A further limitation of this research is that a static model 
(agency theory) was used to address a dynamic question. The J-M agency 
theory model identifies relationships in equilibrium settings. The 
analysis in Chapter II required a change in equilibrium. The J-M 
model may not be appropriate for the study of dynamic situations. 
However, the J-M framework has been used in a manner similar to the 
manner in this research by Watts and Zimmerman (1979b) and by J-M 
themselves. The }mpact upon the validity of this research due to 
this potential limit?tion was not considered to be great. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
The Jensen and Meckling Model 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) define an agency relationship 
as "a contract under which one or more persons (the principals) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent." This 
seems to define particularly well the relationship between the stock-
holders and managers of corporations. Typically, these corporations are 
owned by a number of stockholders and managed by individuals who may own 
only a small percentage of the shares outstanding. The shareholders 
are the principals, and the managers are the agents. 
A frequent assumption is that both parties in the corporate agency 
relationship are utility maximizers. If so, then it follows from 
agency theory that management may not always act in the best interest 
of the stockholders. De Alessi (1973) identified one reason for 
divergence between the interest of management and owners in the following 
passage: 
The accounting periods relevant to a manager's wealth would 
roughly be limited to those occurring during his tenure in 
office, and this time horizon would necessarily be shorter 
than a shareholder's to whom all future accounting periods 
matter (p. 848). 
J-M (1976, p. 308) identify costs created by this divergence. 




interest by establishing the proper incentive plans for management and by 
incurring monitoring costs designed to limit management's activities. 
Monitoring costs consist of both costs of observing the activities of 
management and costs incurred to control management's activities. In 
some situations, "bonding costs" will be incurred to guarantee that 
management will not engage in certain harmful activities or that the 
owners will be compensated if management does. Even when the stock-
holders and managers incur the optimal amount of monitoring and bonding 
costs, a divergence may still exist between managers' decisions and 
optimal decisions from the stockholders' viewpoint. The wealth effect 
of this loss in stockholder welfare is termed the residual loss. The 
sum of the monitoring costs, bonding costs, and the residual loss is 
identified as agency costs. 
Agency costs are the driving force behind the J-M analysis. Owners 
of a firm wish to maximize firm value. One way to increase firm value 
is to hire auditors to monitor management and thereby reduce managers' 
aberrant activities. 
Figure l(a) illustrates the relationship between firm value, 
manager's expenditure on non-pecuniary (hereafter NP) benefits and 
the effects of auditing. The analysis herein presented assumes that 
investors value a firm as the present value (PV) of future cash flows. 
An increase (decrease) in the PV of future cash inflows leads to an 
increase (decrease) in the value (or PV) of the firm. An increase 
(decrease) in the PV of future cash outflows leads to a decrease 
(increase) in the value of the firm. A direct relationship exists 
between firm value and the PV of cash inflows while an inverse relation-
ship exists between firm value and the PV of cash outflows. All cash 
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flows referenced in the discussion of Figure 1 are assumed to refer to 
the PV of current and future cash flows. For ease of presentation, the 
PV notation is dropped during the remainder of this discussion relating 
to Figure 1. 
Line VF in Figure l(a) represents the trade-off between the market 
value of the firm and a manager's NP expenditures. One dollar spent 
on NP benefits reduces the value of the firm one dollar. Therefore, 
VF has a slope of minus one. As a 100% owner of the firm, a manager's 
budget constraint is represented by VF. After selling a (1-a) share 
of the firm, a manager's ownership share is a. A manager's share of 
one dollar of the firm's resources spent on NP benefits is now a; 
i.e., his share of the reduction of firm profits is his ownership share--
a. The broken line AB has slope equal to minus a and represents a 
manager's trade-off between wealth and NP expenditures; i.e., AB is 
his new budget constraint. If point A was a manager's optimal location2 
prior to the sale to outside owners, the new budget constraint would 
pass through point A since a manager could choose the same wealth and 
level of NP benefits as when he was a 100% owner. 
Assume that with ownership share a, the manager's optimal location 
is point B. His NP expenditure is FO and the related value of the firm 
is v0 . Assuming the equity market makes an unbiased estimate of the 
manager's actions, the outside investor would anticipate the NP expendi-
ture of FO and would be willing to pay only (1-a) times v0 for a (1-a) 
share of the firm. The wealth effect is the decrease in firm value 
0 
from a point such as V* to V . 
Outside equity holders can usually influence a manager's consumption 
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actions. The present value of future monitoring expenditures by the 
outside equity holders reduces the value of the firm to them, dollar 
for dollar. This reduces the maximum price they will pay for their 
share of the firm. 
Figure l(a) identifies the effects of monitoring on the manager's 
actions and the value of the firm. Curve CDE represents a constraint 
on the NP benefits that can be taken by management when monitoring 
activities such as auditing financial statements are taken into account. 
The precise shape and location of CDE is dependent upon the outside 
owners' estimate of the limiting ability of the monitoring activity. 
The assumption is made that increases in monitoring expenditures 
decrease F but at a decreasing rate; i.e., there are decreasing returns 
to scale of monitoring activities such as independent audits. Suppose 
the estimate is that an expenditure of M can reduce the manager's NP 
0 1 0 expenditures from F to F and increase the value of the firm from V 
to v1 cv1 = v3-M). The amount the buyer would pay for a (1-d) share 
of the firm, assuming an expenditure of M for monitoring, would be 
(1-8) times v1 . 
The effect of taking monitoring possibilities into account is to 
increase the amount paid for a (1-8) share of the company. Both with 
and without monitoring, the buyer would pay (1-8) times the present 
value of the future net cash flows and would therefore be indifferent 
between the two levels of expenditures. The price paid with monitoring 
is greater because the present value of the future net cash flows is 
greater. Then, if the market makes an unbiased estimate of the effects 
of the monitoring expenditures, the manager retains the increase in 
the market value of the firm that occurs as a result of entering into 
contracts to provide monitoring. 
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The above analysis is a general representation of the relationship 
between monitoring, a manager's consumption of NP benefits, and the 
market price of a share of the firm. The suggestion has been made that 
the price an investor will pay for a share of the firm is related to the 
investor's estimate of the amount of perquisites (or NP benefits) that 
can be taken by the manager. In turn, investors' estimate of the 
monitoring activity's ability to limit the manager's aberrant behavior 
influences the estimated amount of perquisites that can be taken by 
the manager. 
The point of interest in this research is the determiniation of 
the effect of new information concerning the limiting power of the 
monitoring activity--auditing. Given the firm value determination 
framework presented in Figure 1, it is a simple matter to determine 
the effect on firm value of discovering an audit failure. Viewing 
Figure l(b), if it is discovered that the audit limited the manager's 
consumption of NP benefits to F2 instead of F1 for a given firm, it can 
2 
be seen that the value of the firm would fall to V . Alternatively, 
if the manager converts firm assets to personal use, the value of the 
firm will be decreased by the amount of the assets converted (plus the 
amount estimated to be converted in the future). While this result 
would appear to be a relatively simple exercise, determining the effect 
of just such a revelation on other firms that engage the offending 
auditor may be a more difficult task. Watts and Zimmerman (1979b) 
address this issue with the following statement: 
If the market observes the auditor failing to monitor 
management, it will adjust downwards the share price of all 
firms who engage this auditor (to the extent to which the 
auditor does not reduce agency costs) (p. 279). 
15 
The point to note is that in order to see a stock price decrease for a 
given firm, it is not necessary to show the extent to which an auditor 
failed to reduce agency costs for that firm. If it is discovered that 
an auditor has performed at less than the anticipated level, investors 
may adjust their estimates of the limiting power of this auditing 
firm's audit. This may lead to a change in the stock price of all firms 
that engage the auditor in question. 
Figure l(b) is a graphical representation of the result of new 
information concerning an auditor's performance being presented to 
investors. Suppose information is presented indicating that the per-
formance by a company's auditor on this company's audit was less than 
originally anticipated. Specifically, suppose that it was discovered 
that an expenditure of M for auditing services had limited management's 
NP expenditures to F2 and not F1 as had originally been anticipated. 
1 2 
As can be seen the value of the firm would fall from V to V . 
An important consideration relates to the impact on other firms 
that engage this auditor. Observing an auditor "failing to monitor 
management" to the extent anticipated on another firm's audit might 
cause a revision of each investor's estimate of the limiting power 
of the audit on each and every audit that the auditor performs. Should 
this revision occur, for each firm that engages this auditor, investors 
would shift downward their curve CDE in Figure l(a) to a new location, 
such as curve CGH in Figure l(b). 3 The curve shifts "downward" because 
a greater expenditure must be made on the audit than originally 
anticipated in order to limit management's NP expenditures to any 
level. The predicted result is that each firm with financial statements 
audited by this auditor should observe a decrease in their stock price 
when adverse information concerning their auditor's performance is 
4 released. 
The preceding paragraph was the basis for the question of interest 
in the current research. If information was discovered which indicated 
an auditor was performing at less than the anticipated level, did the 
observed stock returns of this auditor's clients reflect the hypo-
thesized stock price decrease? Before presenting the methodology 
used to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter I, the following 
section contains a review of the literature concerning the propriety 
of certain agency theory assumptions. 
Review of Related Literature 
Two of the concerns that exist with respect to the viability of 
the J-M agency theory model as a tool of analysis are reviewed in 
this section. The first concern involves the existence and signif i-
cance of NP benefits. The second concern is whether the model is 
applicable only to the 100% manager owned firm or whether the model 
can be extended to cover a broader range of management-ownership 
combinations. 
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The reliability of the J-M model as a tool of analysis d~pends to 
a large extent upon the existence and the significance of NP benefits. 
Furubotn and Pejovich (1972) presented a comprehensive review of the 
literature concerning the ability of management to engage in behavior 
that is nonoptimal from the viewpoint of the stockholders. The article 
noted the existence of incentives for management to consume NP benefits, 
but there was no consensus (at least at the theoretical level) on 
management's ability to consume NP benefits. 
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Theoretical debates aside, evidence indicating the existence of 
NP expenditures in practice would add support to the validity of the 
J-M agency theory model. A recent U. S. News and World Report labor 
article (September 8, 1981, pp. 61-62) reported on the use of perquisites 
by managers. The report stated that perquisites (or perks) are very 
popular. They supplement executives' salaries which are eroded by 
inflation. The article stated that perks range from as little as 5 
to 10% of salary to as much as 25 to 30%. The article also reported 
that managers do not like to report perks to stockholders. Many 
companies sweep perks "under the rug" and occasionally ask accountants 
to camouflage perks under other categories. 
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) (December 21, 1981, p. 6) provided 
further evidence that management perks have gone undisclosed. In 
"Vornado Broke Rules, SEC Charges" the WSJ reported that the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged that Vornado, Inc. failed to 
disclose company cars, a chauffeur, and opera tickets, among other 
items, provided to company officers during the period 1975-1980. 
It appears then that perquisites are found in practice. An 
interesting point to note is that the "perks" referred to in the 
preceding articles consisted of expenditures on benefits such as 
company cars, free medical exams, use of vacation resorts, free sports 
tickets and even personal bodyguards. These are some of the more 
visible forms of perquisites. A more subtle form of perquisite 
identified by J-M (1976, p. 313) is the decision by the manager not 
to devote effort to pursue new profitable ventures. In other words, 
NP benefits may accrue to management by work avoidance or shirking. 
18 
If shirking can be accepted as a perquisite, the loss in firm value 
due to perquisites or NP benefits could surely be significant. One 
manifestation of shirking could be the existence of an inadequate 
internal control system to safeguard company assets and to maintain 
the integrity of the financial reporting system. The result could be 
loss of company resources due to carelessness or misappropriation and/or 
materially misleading financial statements. In this context, an audit 
failure could result from an over evaluation of internal control which 
could lead to under performance of substantive tests. 
Hughes and Cox (1981) provided another example of shirking. They 
posited that conflicts of interest may exist within firms which inhibit 
productivity. The failure of management either to reduce or eliminate 
these conflicts is shirking. Hughes and Cox hypothesized that the 
audit could be a means of reducing these conflicts. If the audit can 
both reduce expenditures on the more visible forms of perquisites and 
lead to greater productivity through a reduction in shirking, then 
the audit may well play a significant role in stock price determination. 
The foregoing discussion suggested that perquisites exist and that 
the value of perquisites may be more than trivial. If these suggestions 
are in fact true, and if the audit can be used to limit managements' 
aberrant activites, then the relationship hypothesized by the J-M 
agency theory model should exist when 100% management-owned firms 
first offer ownership shares to outside parties. 
In extending the agency theory analysis to the more typical 
case of the manager owning either no stock or a small fraction of the 
firm's outstanding shares of stock, Watts and Zimmerman (1979a) 
hypothesized that agency costs are borne (at least partially) by the 
manager in the form of wage adjustments. The owners are aware that 
management has incentives to engage in activities divergent from the 
owners' best interest. The owners then estimate the monetary 
19 
effects of the management's divergent activities and adjust management's 
salary accordingly. 
This wage adjustment process is consistent with that hypothesized 
by Ng (1978), Ng and Stoeckenius (1979), Wallace (1980), and Antle (1980). 
According to these works, the owner sets a management compensation scheme 
that will encourage alignment of the interests of the manager and the 
interests of the owner. 5 This compensation scheme is based upon the 
owner's subjective probability distributions for the manager's and 
auditor's possible actions and upon the owner's conditional probability 
that the audit will-detect an error in management's report (the company's 
financial statements), given that an error exists. The compensation 
scheme specifies penalties to be assessed for nonoptimal behavior on 
the manager's part that is revealed by the financial statements and/or 
the auditor's report. 
The wage adjustment process just outlined permits a stock price 
adjustment for new information concerning an auditor's performance. 
The stock price reaction may exist, in part, because the wage contract 
is specified at the beginning of the period covered by the contract. 
If information is discovered after the contract is set that would cause 
investors to decrease their estimate of the conditional probability 
that the audit will detect an error given that one exists in the 
financial statements, then the onwer would wish to decrease the 
manager's wage to reflect this information but would be unable to do 
so because he is bound by the original contract. Any failure to 
adjust the wage will be reflected in a stock price adjustment. The 
current owner(s) will bear the loss in firm value due to such new 
information. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1979a) noted that the J-M analysis may be 
applicable to the case where owners hire managers with no ownership 
interest in the firm. The J-M analysis continues to be applicable to 
this new situation because, since information is costly, the owners 
will not obtain all information necessary to make a full adjustment of 
the managers' wages. Potential investors will realize this and adjust 
the price paid for a share of the firm accordingly. In essence, the 
managers and the current firm owners will be combined and the combina-
tion will be treated as the owner/manager in the J-M analysis. 
In summary, this chapter contains a presentation of the J-M agency 
theory model that predicts a specific stock price reaction to informa-
tion concerning the "quality" of the service provided by an auditor. 
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The existence' and significance of NP benefits is of fundamental 
importance to the J-M agency theory model. Evidence has been presented 
suggesting that perquisites exist and may be substantial. The suggestion 
has also been made that the J-M analysis may be appropriate to a broad 
range of management/onwership combinations. The implication is that 
the model may be useful for predicting stock price reactions. 
ENDNOTES 
1see Berhold (1971), Heckerman (1975), Ross (1973, 1974), and 
Wilson (1968) for literature concerning construction of incentives for 
the agent to act in the principal's interest. 
2The optimal locations mentioned in reference to Figure 1 were 
assumed to be points of tangency between relevant indifference curves 
and budget constraints. The indifference curves were omitted from 
the graphs to reduce clutter. 
3Note that the adjusted curve would go through point C, since an 0 
expenditure of zero for monitoring would give a firm market value of V • 
4 DeAngelo (1981) hypothesized just such a stock price reaction 
when it is discovered that an auditor has failed to provide the level 
of service previously anticipated. The article noted a "negative impact 
on firm value of retaining an auditor who has been shown to 'cheat"' 
(p. 310). Cheating in the DeAngelo context is an auditor providing 
a lower level of assurance on financial statements than the level called 
for in the auditor's employment contract. 
5 For a formal mathematical representation of the process, see 




As described in Chapter II, the J-M agency theory model hypothesizes 
a specific relationship between firm value and auditor performance. This 
relationship is noted in Watts and Zimmerman (1979b) and DeAngelo (1981). 
Both of these works contend that anticipation of the hypothesized stock 
price reaction can be used to help explain the motivation behind 
observed owner, manager, and/or auditor behavior. The existence of the 
proposed firm value-auditor performance relationship is vital to con-
clusions reached by Watts and Zimmerman, and DeAngelo. 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the proposed relation-
ship between auditor performance and the value of the firm. The 
preceding chapters contained a presentation of the need for this study, 
the theoretical development that allows the specification of the 
hypothesis of interest, and a review of current literature on this 
issue. The purpose of this chapter is to present the development of 
the methodology used to test the hypothesis of interest. This chapter 
consists of the following sections: methodological considerations, 
methodological overview, time frame determination, sample selection, 
portfolio return construction, and test statistic. 
Methodological Considerations 
The purpose of this section of Chapter III is to present a 
discussion of certain research design alternatives available for 
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security price research. The section begins with a general discussion 
of the market model (MM) methodology, which is often employed in such 
studies. The section continues with a general discussion of an 
alternative research methodology, the difference in returns methodology. 
The conditions under which each research design choice dominates the 
other and the conditions under which the two methodologies are equivalent 
are noted. The section concludes with a discussion of the assumptions 
underlying the methodology employed in this research. 
The methodology of ten followed in market studies makes use of the 
MM. The MM and ordinary least squares (OLS) parameter estimation 
provide a method whereby the return on a security is partitioned into 
two components: systematic and unsystematic. The systematic component 
is that part of the security return that is linearly related to the 
return on the market portfolio. The unsystematic component is the 
residual portion of the security return and is uncorrelated with the 
systematic component. 
An advantage to using the MM (as opposed to using the raw return 
itself) is that the effects of extraneous factors related to market 
wide movements, which may be unrelated to the question of interest in 
the re.search, can be extracted from the return on an investment in an 
individual security. However, Beaver (1981) noted that the MM makes 
no assumption about the stochastic process generating a security return. 
The MM is simply an artificial partitioning of a security into two 
orthogonal components. If the true return generating process is multi-
factored, the MM "filters out" only that portion of the return linearly 
related to the market portfolio. The portions of the return relating 
to other factors unrelated to the question of interest and unrelated to 
the market portfolio continue to be reflected in the residual return. 
Therefore, residual returns obtained from the MM may still reflect 
information unrelated to the question of interest (i.e., the MM may not 
filter out enough of the effects of extraneous information). 
Consequently, the variance of the MM residual may be greater than the 
variance of a truely firm-specific security return metric. The result 
is that although tests conducted using the MM residual may be more 
powerful than tests using only the raw return, they may be less 
powerful than a test using the truely firm-specific return metric. 
Recent studies have discovered evidence indicating that the true 
security return generating process may well be multi-factor. For 
example, Foster (1975) discovered evidence indi~ating industry factors 
2 
may impact on individual security returns. Foster found that the R 
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for the regression equations for insurance industry firms were increased 
significantly by including in the regression calculations, in addition 
to a market index, an industry index. In addition, King (1966) and 
Sunder (1973) noted the need to control for industry effects and Kross 
(1982) included an industry index along with a proxy for the market 
index. 
It appears, then, that due to the omission of relevant variables 
from the model, the MM may not provide the least variance security 
return metric. A methodology which may mitigate the effects of vari-
ables omitted from the regression equation is the difference in security 
returns_ methodology. Under this methodology, control portfolio 
construction procedures are employed that are designed to create 
treatment and control portfolios that have security returns that 
behave in a similar manner. This is attempted by matching treatment 
and control firms based on the similarity of a number of items hypo-
thesized to influence the generation of a security's return. Each 
treatment firm is matched with a control firm with a similar systematic 
risk (as measured by the beta of the MM), from the same industry (as 
identified by the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code), and 
of the same relative size (as measured by either total assets or total 
sales) or some combination of the above mentioned criteria. (For 
example, Harrison (1977), Ingram (1978), and Ricks (1982) matched firms 
on beta and industry; Meek (1983) matched firms on industry and size; 
and Vigeland (1981) matched firms on beta, industry, and size.) The 
major difference between the treatment and control samples is that 
the control sample is selected from the pool of firms either hypo-
thesized not to be affected by the question of interest in the research 
or hypothesized to be affected in a manner opposite to that of the 
treatment sample firms. 
Such control sample construction procedures are designed to assure 
that treatment and control samples are of highly similar composition. 
The assumption is that any factor not related to the event being tested 
should affect the treatment and control samples similarly. Therefore, 
any unusual treatment sample activity not observed in the control 
sample during the event period is assumed attributable to the infor-
mation contained in the signal of interest. The security return metric 
used for testing is the difference in treatment and control sample 
returns. 
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The motivation for the use of the difference in returns methodology 
is the desire to filter out of a test statistic the influence of all 
factors not related to the question of interest in the research. In 
other words, the desire to obtain a least variance security return 
measure motivates the use of the difference in returns methodology. 
The variance of the security return metric, difference in returns, is 
var(d .. ) = var(r.) + var(r.) - 2 cov(r., r.) 
l, J l J l J 





variance of the difference between the returns of 
security i and security j, 
variance of the return of security i, 





covariance between the returns of the two securities. 
The matching procedures typically employed attempt to maximize the 
covariance term of equation (1). Maximizing the covariance term leads 
to the minimum variance for the return metric, difference in returns. 
The specific matching procedures that have been employed may not 
have led to the maximum covariance between the returns of the matched 
pair firms. The matching procedures that have been used may have 
captured some of the factors that lead to a covariance between two 
returns, but other factors may have existed that influenced security 
returns that were not considered in the matching process that was 
employed. In addition, matching firms on the similarity of their 
betas from the MM was unappealing. This was because knowledge of 
the betas of two securities does not imply any relationship between 
the returns of the two securities. Information implied by knowledge 
of two securities betas can be demonstrated by the following example. 
The beta obtained from the MM is calculated as 
b. 
l 
cov(r. , r )/var(r ) 
it mt mt 
(2) 
where cov(r .. , r ) 
1] mt co
variance between security i's return and the 
return on the market portfolio, and 
var(r ) = variance of the market portfolio. mt 
The correlation between the return on security i and the market is 
calculated as 
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Pim= cov(r., r )//(var(r.t)*var(r )) (3) it mt 1 mt 
where p. is the correlation between return i and the market. If b 1 im 
equals b 2 and var(r 1t) equals var(r2t)' then from equations (2) and (3), 
it can be shown that plm equals p2m. In other words, equality of the 
betas for two securities can imply equal correlation of each security's 
returns with the market return. 
However, info.rmation about the correlation between each security's 
return and the market provides little information relative to the 
correlation between the returns of the two securities themselves. 
Muliak (1972) noted 
The fact that two variables correlate moderately and equally 
well with a third variable is no guarantee that the first two 
variables are even moderately correlated. In other words, 
inferences from correlation coefficients are not trasitive 
across variables (p. 329). 
The fact that the returns of firm 1 and the returns of firm 2 are 
correlated with the return on the market portfolio does not guarantee 
that the firm 1 return is correlated with the firm 2 return. The two 
firms' returns may be correlated, but in the absence of additional 
information, one cannot make this determination based on similarity 
of the two firm's betas from the MM. 
A superior procedure for matching treatment and control firms 
in past studies would appear to have been to match the firms based on 
the observed relationship between the returns of the two firms over a 
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period covering the time span of the research. Such a matching procedure 
would have had the potential to overcome the shortfalls of the control 
sample selection procedures typically employed. While matching firms 
based on similarity of betas may result in two firms which have 
correlated returns, matching on the correlation between the two 
securities' returns would have assured the desired result. Matching 
on the observed relationship also would have assured that all factors 
impacting on a security's return (excluding the event of interest in 
the research) were captured. 
The matching of treatment and control firms for the current 
research was accomplsihed by matching on the observed security return 
relationships that existed over the time period covered by the research. 
The expectation was that by matching on the maximum correlations 
observed, the covariance term of equation (1) would have been maximized. 
The result was that the difference in returns was expected to be a 
minimum variance security return measure. 
Beaver (1981) analyzed the power of tests conducted using the 
difference in returns methodology. The magnitude of the variance of 
the return metric, difference in security returns, was compared to 
the magnitude of the variance of the treatment firm residuals obtained 
using the MM. Beaver noted certain conditions that should be met before 
the difference in returns methodology would be superior to a methodology 
based on residual returns. The conditions are: (1) the treatment and 
control portfolios must have the same betas; (2) the variance of the 
security returns for both portfolios must be equivalent; (3) the time 
series correlation among the returns comprising the two portfolios must 
exceed .5; and (4) the assumption must be made that the equality of 
the betas imply an equality of the expected returns of the two 
portfolios. 
The sample selection procedures in the current research may have 
provided two portfolios for which Beaver's conditions held sufficiently 
well to justify the use of the difference in returns methodology. The 
sample selection procedures were expected to provide two relatively 
large portfolios that were diversified across industries. When this 
occurs, the portfolio returns can be (and were) expected to approximate 
the market return. The betas of the two portfolios were both expected 
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to be equal to approximately one. In addition, the equality of the 
variance of the treatment and control firms' security returns was 
assumed. To further satisfy Beaver's conditions, the equality of the 
two firms' betas must be assumed to imply equality of the expected 
returns of the two portfolios. As noted above, in the absence of 
additional information about the relationship between the two securities, 
this implication can not always be assumed to hold. However, the 
control sample selection procedures employed in this study were 
designed to obtain firms which did have an observed relationship 
between one another. The matching procedure employed indicated that 
the assumption of equality of expected portfolio returns was not 
unreasonable. 
The final condition noted by Beaver was that the time series 
correlation among the firms comprising the portfolios exceed the .5 
level. Correlation is thought to be greatest when the security returns 
under investigation are drawn from overlapping time periods. If the 
time series correlation can ever be expected to exceed the .5 level, 
it would be expected to occur when the research consisted of a large 
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number of overlapping time periods. The current research contains not 
only overlapping time periods, but identical time periods from which 
security returns were obtained. The commonality of the time periods 
covered by the research indicated that the correlation had the potential 
to be relatively high. In addition, the firms were matched on the 
basis of time series correlation. Therefore the anticipated level of 
time series correlation among the firms comprising the treatment and 
control portfolios was expected to exceed the .5 level in this study. 
The difference in returns methodology was selected as the research 
design for this study because this research design was expected to 
provide a minimum variance security return metric. Matching firms 
based upon the maximum correlations observed was expected to maximize 
the covariance term of equation (1). The result was that the variance 
of the difference in returns was expected to be minimized. The 
assumption was also made that the conditions noted by Beaver (1981) 
were met and the return metric, difference in security returns, may 
have been superior to a return metric based upon a residual return 
analysis. The following sections of Chapter III contain a detailed 
presentation of the specific methodology employed in the current study. 
Methodological Overview 
The event of interest in this research was the July 2, 1975 SEC 
sanction of PMM. A group of PMM client firms were identified. This 
group of firms was examined for the existence of data missing from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily returns tape for 
the time period under consideration and all firms with missing data 
were eliminated from further consideration. Control portfolio 
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selection procedures were then applied and a control portfolio with a 
high degree of correlation with the treatment portfolio was obtained. 
One hunred independent weekly observations of the treatment-control 
portfolio difference were obtained and the mean and variance of these 
observations were used to test whether the difference in returns for 
the even week were significantly greater than the mean difference of 
the 100 nonevent weeks. 
Time Frame Determination 
The objective of this research was to determine if a stock return 
decrease occurred around the date of the July 2, 1975 SEC sanction. 
The length of the test period necessary to capture the hypothesized 
reaction was difficult to determine. Verrecchia (1980, p. 63) suggested 
that, because there is a cost involved in processing information, there 
exists "a relationship between the rapidity of price adjustments to 
information and the accuracy or reliability of the information, as it 
is perceived by investors." Based on a competitive two-person trading 
game analysis, Verrecchia (1980, p. 87) concluded,·" . as the 
precision associated with the information (as determined by a consensus 
judgment among investors) increases, the rapidity of price adjustments 
to the information will increase correspondingly." The "precision" 
of the signal (the SEC sanction) in the current research was difficult 
to estimate. 
The test period in this research was arbitrarily chosen to be 
the five day trading period that began two days before the date of the 
sanction and that ended two days after that date. The five day trading 
periods used in this research are referred to as weeks. The event week 
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included the trading days of June 30, July 1, 2, 3, and 7. The Friday 
following the SEC sanction was the Fourth of July and the market was 
closed on that day. The sanction was announced on July 2 by the SEC 
and was covered extensively in the WSJ on July 3. The event week 
contained a full trading day which took place five days after the date 
of the release of the SEC sanction and four days after the sanction 
was reported in the WSJ. The event week was believed to be a 
sufficiently long period of time in which to capture a stock return 
reaction to the sanction, should one have occurred. 
A residual inspection procedure was conducted to determine if an 
extended time period appeared necessary. Scholes and Williams (1977) 
(hereafter S-W) have shown that, due to nontrading, OLS estimates of the 
MM are biased when applied to.daily return data. S-W estimates of the 
parameters of the MM tend to reduce the bias inherent in OLS estimates 
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where the supercripts s denotes the observed rate of return; and 
B~ (B~ + B. + B~)/(1+2p ) i i i i m 
where B1., B., and B~ are the OLS estimates of the MM obtained by l l 
regressing r. on r 1 , r , and r +l' respectively; and p is the it m,t- mt m,t m 
autocorrelation coefficient for the market index, r . The S-W estimates 
m 
were calculated for each sample firm using the 150 day period beginning 
170 trading days and ending 21 days before the July 2, 1975 event date. 
The equally weighted index on the CRSP tape was used as a proxy for the 
market index. The parmeters thus obtained were used to calculate the 
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estimated residual returns for each sample firm for the 41 trading day 
period centered on the July 2, 1975 event date. Ninety-five percent 
confidence intervals forEE.ch firm's residuals were plotted for each 
sample firm along with the estimated residuals themselves. In addition, 
the cumulative average residual (CAR) for both the treatment and control 
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day -20 to 20, 
the number of firms in each portfolio, and 
the residual return for firm ion day j. 
The analysis of the individual residual plottings as well as the 
examination of the CAR for each portfolio provided no evidence that ·the 
event period should be extended beyond the five trading day period used 
in the research. 
The total time perion under consideration in this research was 
211 weeks. Two hundred of these weeks were used for treatment and 
control portfolio matching and nonevent week return calculations. 
Ten weeks (five on each side of the event week) were held out of all 
calculations. This was done to attempt to eliminate any bias that may 
have been induced by market reaction to the SEC sanction during these 
weeks. The remaining week was the week of the July 2, 1975 SEC 
sanction of PMM, the event week. 
The 200 weeks that were used for matching and the nonevent week 
return calculations were identified as weeks w = -155, •.. , -6 and 
w = 6, ..• , 55 where w = 0 was defined as the event week. One hundred 
of these 200 weeks were selected at random and used to calculate the 
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return differences employed for hypothesis testing. These weeks were 
selected at random in order to provid~ an assurance of independence 
between the observations used for testing purposes. Any given observa-
tion selected, implies little about any other observation selected. 
The remaining 100 weeks were used to match treatment and control 
portfolios. 
The following time line is presented to clarify the distribution 
of the weekly periods covered by this research. The symbol, 1-1, 
represents one, five trading day period which is denoted as a week. 
The E represents the week of the SEC sanction, the event week; each D 
represents a randomly selected week used in calculating the difference 
in portfolio returns; each M represents a week used in matching 
treatment and control firms; and each W represents one of the five weeks 
on each side of the event week that were withheld from all calculations. 
-155 ~154 -153 . . . -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 . . . 52 53 54 55 
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Gonedes (1973), Grant (1980), and Oppong (1980) have implied that 
up to five years may be a reasonable time period to assume a stable 
security return relationship. The time span of this research covered 
a total of just over four years (June 1, 1972 through August 5, 1976). 
This time span was selected as a compromise between the need for a 
sufficiently short period of time to assure a stable security return 
relationship and the need for a sufficient number of observed weekly 
returns to maintain a large number of degrees of freedom for hypothesis 
testing. 
Sample Selection 
Both a treatment and a control sample of firms were obtained. 
The treatment sample consisted of all firms: 
1. Which were listed as PMM clients in the 1976 edition of 
Who Audits Americal (WAA) or were identified by the WSJ 
as having changed audit firms from PMM between 
June 30, 1975 and December 31, 1975. 
2. Which had 1974 sales (as reported in WAA) of $10 million 
or greater. 
3. Which had security returns listed on the CRSP daily returns 
file. 
4. Which had no missing data on the CRSP daily returns file for 
the matching and the testing periods . 
. The 1976 edition of WAA served as the basis for identifying PMM 
client firms. Requirement (2) was invoked in order to make the identi-
fication procedure manageable. The assumption was made that the 
likelihood of a small firm being included on the CRSP tape and 
ultimately being included in the treatment sample was remote. An 
examination was conducted to determine the reasonableness of this 
assumption. No evidence was discovered that indicated that a large 
number of these smaller firms would, in fact, have been included in 
the ultimate treatment portfolio. If evidence had been discovered that 
indicated that a large number of potential treatment firms were 
excluded by requirement (2), this matching procedure would have been 
deleted. 
The control group sample was created.by matching each treatment 
firm with a nonPMM2 client firm that had security returns which were 
highly correlated with the treatment firm's security returns for the 
time period under consideration. This was accomplished as follows: 
all firms listed on the CRSP tape with no missing data for the time 
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period under study were identified. The daily stock returns for all 
firms so identified were converted into weekly returns using the 
procedure described in the following section of this chapter. The 
correlation was calculated between the treatment firm's weekly returns 
and all other firm's weekly returns for the 100 weeks identified as 
matching weeks. For each treatment firm, one control firm was selected. 
Each control firm was matched with only one treatment firm. The 
expectation was that one potential control firm might have been the 
highest correlated firm with more than one treatment firm. Therefore, 
some criterion had to be employed to allow the selection process to 
be completed. The control sample was selected so as to maximize the 
average correlation between the treatment-control matched pair firms 
ultimately chosen. To meet this objective, for each treatment firm, 
the ten firms whose returns were most highly correlated with the 
treatment firm were listed, along with the correlation coefficient for 
each possible match. The match ultimately selected was that combination 
which led to the smallest reduction in the average matched pair corre-
lation between the two portfolios. This particular matching procedure 
was expected to result in a high degree of correlation between the 
treatment portfolio return and the control portfolio return. In other 
words, maximizing the correlation at the individual firm level was 
expected to provide treatment and control portfolios which were 
maximally correlated at the portfolio level. 
The disadvantage to the methodology employed in this research 
was that two firms may be matched based on "spurious correlation." 
Such an occurrence was a real concern. However, the deleterious 
effects of such an occurrence were unclear. Since the relationship 
observed between the matched pairs appeared to exist across the time 
span covered by the correlation calculations, it was expected to 
exist during the event week also. If this expectation was reasonable, 
the SEC sanction would still have been the appropriate differentiating 
factor during the event week and the methodology employed in the 
current research may have been appropriate. If so, then the matching 
procedure employed may have provided a stronger test (due to a higher 
level of covariance) than the matching procedures typically employed 
in security return studies, while sacrificing little in the way of 
generality of the results. 
Portfolio Return Construction 
The matching procedures used in this research required the 
conversion of daily security returns obtained from the CRSP tape into 











return on the ith firm for week w, and 
r. 
l,t 
return on the ith firm for qay t. 
The above procedure resulted in a transformation of the returns on a 
security from 1,055 trading days listed on the CRSP daily returns file 
into 211 weekly returns. 
Once the above conversion was completed for all firms on the CRSP 
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tape with no missing data for the time period under study, the treatment 
and control firm matching was accomplished. After this process was 
completed, the data for the individual treatment firms was converted 
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into a treatment portfolio return and the data for the control firms was 














return on portfolio b in week w, 
return on the ith firm of portfolio b for week w, and 
number of securities in portfolio b. 
The weekly return on a portfolio consisted of the return for a five-day 
period, t = 1 to 5, on an equal investment in firms i, i = 1, ... , N, 
beginning on the morning of t 1 with the sale occurring the evening 
of t 5. 
Test Statistic 
The difference in weekly returns was calculated both at the 
individual matched pair level and at the portfolio level. The 










r . t1,w 
difference for 
return on the 
return on the 
pair i. during week w, 
ith control firm during week w, and 
ith treatment firm during week w. 
The difference at the portfolio level was then calculated as: 
d p,w r - r c,w t,w 
where d difference in p ,w portfolio returns during week w, 
r = return on the control portfolio during week w, and c,w 
r = return on the treatment portfolio during week w. t,w 
The mean difference and the related standard deviation for the 
100 random weekly differences was computed as: 
1 
100 
d l: d p 100 w=l p,w 
100 
(d. - d) 2 l: . 
i=l 1 
sd 99 
where d mean difference in weekly returns, and 
p 
sd = standard deviation of the weekly differences. 
At the portfolio level, since both portfolios were expected to 
·reflect the market portfolio, the expected value of the mean difference 
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was near zero for nonevent periods. The treatment and control portfolio 
weekly returns were expected to be equivalent. The precise expected 
value of the return difference was not critical given the methodology 
employed, i.e., only the relative position of each expected portfolio 
return relative to the mean location determined during the nonevent 
weeks was important in determining the expected value of the event 
week difference. During the week of the sanction, the nonPMM portfolio 
return had an expected value equal to the mean nonPMM portfolio return 
calculated during the nonevent weeks. The PMM portfolio return was 
hypothesized to be below the mean value for the PMM portfolio calculated 
during the nonevent periods. The difference (control return minus 
treatment return) in the returns of the two portfolios during the event 
week was therefore expected to be positive and above the mean difference 
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during nonevent periods. The difference activity at the matched pair 
level was expected to react in the same manner as the portfolio level. 
A one tailed z test was used to determine if the observed difference 
in the weekly returns were consistent with the hypothesized return 
activity. Formally, the null and alternative hypotheses were: 
where the subscript E represents the event week. Thus, under the null 
hypothesis the statistic 
has a z distribution with the mean equal to zero and a variance equal 
3 to one. The approximate observed significance level was calculated 
at the portfolio level. The individual matched pair z statistics were 
presented as descriptive measures of the treatment-control matched pair 
return activity. In addition, the number of matched pair difference 
z statistics which exceeded critical values for significance levels of 
.OS and .10 were noted for matched pairs where the normality of the 
distribution of the 100 nonevent week differences could not be rejected 
at the .10 significance level. The normality of the underlying 
distribution was assessed by reference to the Kolomogorov-Smirnov 
D-statistic calculated for each difference stream. 
The results of the data analysis based on the above noted tests 
are presented in Chapter IV. The tests conducted provided unexpected 
results. In order to obtain additional evidence pertaining to the 
direction of the security return activity during the week of the SEC 
sanction, a test was conducted using S-W estimates of the parameters 
of the MM for the PMM client portfolio only. The S-W estimates were 
calculated using the 100 week matching period. The estimates were made 
by regressing the treatment portfolio weekly returns on the weekly 
values of an equally weighted index. The index was constructed by 
converting the equally weighted index from the CRSP· daily returns file 
into weekly values. The conversion process was the same as that used 
to convert the daily security returns into weekly values. The S-W 
estimates were then used to calculate the residual weekly return for 
the treatment portfolio using the 100 nonevent test weeks and the 
week of the SEC sanction. 
A z test was conducted to determine if the residual return during 
the week of the SEC sanction was significantly below the mean residual 
obtained from the 100 nonevent weeks. The residual return test 
provided results consistent with the difference in the returns tests 
in terms of the direction of the security return activity. The result 
of the residual return test is reported in Chapter IV along with the 




1The 1976 edition was based on data obtained from financial 
statements for years ended in 1975. 
2The identity of each of the sample firms' auditor was obtained 
by reference to WAA. The identity of each firm's auditor was verified 
by reference to MOOdy's Industrial Manual where possible. 
3The z test was used in the current research instead of the t test 
because the sample size of 100 observations was deemed large enough to 
justify the assumption that the sample mean and the sample variance 
equaled the true population parameters. With the population parameters 
assumed to be known, the use of the z test is appropriate. In addition, 
the test performed was analogous to the two sample t tests in the 









slnl + s2n2 
n 1 + n 2 - 2 
the variance of sample i and 
the number of observations in sample i. 
2 In the current research, n 1 equals 100, n 2 equals 1, s 2 equals zero, 
and x2 equals the event week realization. The t calc reduces to 
xl - x 
t 2 = 
calc I si 101 99 
The difference between the calculated t and the calculated z would be 
so small that the two tests would provide essentially equivalent results. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA COLLECTION AND RESULTS OF THE DATA ANALYSIS 
Sample Selection 
An examination of the 1976 edition of WAA provided a list of 968 
firms which were identified as PMM clients. Of these, 243 firms (25%) 
reported sales under $10 million. In order to assess the potential 
impact of the $10 million sales limitation on the treatment sample (see 
requirement 2, p. 35), the percentage of the PMM client firms with 
sales of $10 million (as listed in WAA) which were ultimately included 
in the treatment portfolio was determined. Of the 20 firms with listed 
sales of $10 million, only one met all other sample se.lection require-
ments and was ultimately included in the treatment sample. Given that 
only 5% of the potential treatment firms with $10 million of sales was 
ultimately included in the treatment portfolio, the loss in potential 
treatment firms due to the $10 million sales limitation was assumed 
to be insignificant. Therefore, the $10 million lower limit on 
reported sales was invoked and the 243 firms with sales under $10 
million were eliminated from further consideration. 
Of the remaining 725 firms (968-243), 383 were not listed on the 
CRSP daily returns tape (requirement 3, p. 35) and were deleted from 
the study. An additional 165 firms were deleted due to the existence 
of missing data (either no data listed or the CRSP missing data code 
encountered) on the CRSP tape for the time period under study. The 
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application of the listed treatment identification procedures resulted 
in a total treatment sample of 177 firms identified as PMM clients. 
The identification of the control sample was accomplished by 
identifying the ten nonPMM client firms that had weekly returns that 
were most highly correlated with each treatment firm over the period 
used for matching purposes. To produce this listing, the correlation 
was calculated between the returns of each of the 177 treatment firms 
and the returns of all 1,401 nonPMM client firms listed on the CRSP 
tape with no missing data for the period under study. Correlation 
coefficients were calculated over the 100 weeks used for matching 
purposes and were stored in a matrix that contained 177 columns and 
1,401 rows. The columns represented treatment firms and the rows 
represented potential control firms; Using this matrix, each column 
was searched for the top ten correlation coefficients. A list was made 
containing the CRSP identification numbers and the correlation 
coefficients of each of the top ten correlated firms for each of the 
177 treatment firms. From this list a new list was made containing 
the identification number for each treatment firm matched with the 
identification number of the treatment firm's highest correlated firm. 
The new list was searched for tionPMM firms that appeared more than 
once on the list. A firm being listed more than once signified that 
this particular firm was ranked as the highest correlated firm with 
more than one treatment firm. In the instances where multiple 
treatment firms were most highly correlated with one nonPMM client 
firm, all but one of these treatment firms were matched with a control 
firm that ranked as other than the highest correlated firm. The 
particular treatment-control combination ultimately chosen was that 
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combination that led to the highest average correlation across the 
treatment-control matched pairs. 
In order to clarify the matching procedure employed, consider the 
following example. Assume that treatment firm A was correlated with 
the nonPMM firm C at the .80 level and was correlated with the nonPMM 
firm D at the .70 level. Also assume that treatment firm B was 
correlated with firm C at the .60 level and was correlated with nonPMM 
firm E at the .40 level. The application of the selection process in 
this instance would result in an A-D combination and a B-C combination. 
This particular combination would result in an average correlation 
between the two pairs of .65 [(.70 + .60)/2]. Any other combination 
chosen would have resulted.in a lower average correlation for the two 
pairs of firms (and would have had the same effect on the average 
correlation coefficient for the entire portfolio). 
Table I displays the number of PMM client firms that were matched 
with their first highest, second highest, etc. correlated nonPMM 
client firms. As can be seen from the table, 133 or 75.1% of the 
treatment firms were matched with the nonPMM firm with stock returns 
most highly correlated with the respective treatment firm. Another 
33 firms or 18.7% of the treatment sample were matched with the nonPMM 
firm that ranked as the second most highly correlated firm with the 
respective treatment firm. Only 6.3% of the treatment firms were 
matched with control firms that ranked lower than the second most 
highly correlated firm. Certain implications that can be drawn from 




TREATMENT-CONTROL CORRELATION RANKINGS 
Number of 
Rank Firms Percentage 
1 133 75.1 
2 33 18.7 
3 5 2.8 
4 4 2.2 
6 1 .6 
7 1 .6 
Totals 177 100.0 
Table II presented below displays information pertaining to the 
distribution of the treatment-control correlation coefficients. 
Although the lowest correlation coefficient was .3766, 90% of the 
matched pairs had a correlation coefficient of .5 or greater. Table II 
shows that the average correlation was .5954. The median correlation 
coefficient was _.5901. The data in Table II provided an indication 
that the matching procedures employed in the current research provided 
matched pairs of firms that exhibited a fairly strong degree of 
association with one another. 
In addition to the data in Table II, the average correlation 
achievable had each treatment firm been matched with its highest 
correlated firm was calculated. The purpose of this calculation was 
to assess the impact on average correlation of matching firms with 
other than their highest correlated firm. The average of the 177 
maximum matched pair correlations was .6005. The reduction in average 
correlation was only .0051. If average matched pair correlations can 
act as a surrogate indicator for the strength of the portfolio correla-
tion, the reduction in portfolio correlation appears to have been 
minimal due to the matching criteria employed. 
TABLE II 
DISTRIBUTIONAL PROPERTIES OF THE TREATMENT-CONTROL 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
Deciles of the Distribution of the 177 Matched Pairs: 
47 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
.5012 .5367 .5522 .5695 .5901 .6049 .6264 .6544 
Other Distributional Properties of the 177 Matched Pairs: 





.3766 to .8125 
.6960 
Aggregate Treatment-Control Portfolio Correlation Coefficient: 
Portfolio Correlation Coefficient .9884 
.8125 
The actual portfolio correlation coefficient was .9884. A correla-
tion coefficient of this magnitude was not unexpected. The treatment-
control matching procedures were expected to lead to a high degree of 
correlation at the portfolio level. Aggregation to the portfolio level 
was expected to diversify away a portion of the "noise" contained in 
the individual returns themselves. If the basic return generation 
process for each of the matched pairs was similar (which was the 
assumption underlying the matching criteria employed), reduction of 
random noise elements in the returns could be expected to lead to 
portfolio returns which reflect the association between the true 
underlying return generation processes. In addition and as noted 
previously, both the treatment and control portfolios were expected 
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to be composed of a highly diversified (in terms of industry classifi-
cations) group of firms. Given relatively large diversified portfolios, 
both sets of portfolio returns can be expected to approximate the 
returns on the market portfolio. When this occurs, a high degree of 
correlation between the returns of the two portfolios can be expected. 
The portfolio selection procedures employed provided both a 
treatment sample and a highly correlated control sample. The final 
step undertaken in the portfolio selection process was to search for 
evidence of other events which may have influenced the returns of 
individual firms and which may have been unrelated to the SEC sanction 
of PMM. A search for information relating to any of the 354 sample 
firms during the months of June and July, 1975 was accomplished by 
reference to the Wall Street Journal Index. Particular attention was 
paid to the dates of earnings announcements for each of the sample 
firms. No sample firm had an earnings announcement during the event 
week and no other information was discovered which indicated the 
need to make any adjustment of the sample firms obtained. 
In addition to the above mentioned information search, a residual 
inspection procedure was conducted. For each firm, S-W (see Chapter 
III, pp. 32-33) estimates of the parameters of the MM were obtained 
using daily data covering a 150 day period which began 170 days prior 
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to the event date. The cumulative average residual (CAR) was calculated 
for each portfolio over the 41 day period centered on the date of the 
SEC sanction. Examination of the CAR for each portfolio provided no 
indication of abnormal portfolio return activity. Had unusual return 
activity been discovered, a more intensive search for information 
relating to the sample firms would have been undertaken. 
The information search undertaken in this research provided no 
indication of conflicting signals that might interfere with investi-
gation of the question of interest in the current research. Therefore, 
all 177 matched pairs were used in the tests reported in the remainder 
of this chapter. Before presenting the results of tests performed, 
the following section contains a discussion of the potential impact 
of correlated data on the presentation of matched pair data. 
Correlated Returns and Matched Pair Data 
Time series correlation is a potential problem in any security 
return study where the returns under investig~tion are obtained from 
overlapping time periods. As noted previously, the current research 
contains identical time periods from which security returns were 
obtained. This fact itself indicated that the potential existed for 
a high degree of correlation among the returns comprising the sample 
portfolios. The problem presented by such correlation was that 
nonindependence among the matched pairs may have limited the appli-
cability of inferences drawn based on the joint distribution of the 
z statistics presented in the following section of this chapter. 
The data in Table I indicated that time series correlation existed 
among certain of the firms of the two portfolios. Although 75.1% of 
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the firms were matched with their highest correlated firm, nearly 25% 
of the firms were matchep with a firm other than their highest correlated 
firm. The highest correlated firms for this latter 25% were contained 
in the control portfolio, but were matched with another treatment firm. 
The implication is that there existed the potential for up to 50% of 
the treatment-control matched pairs to have exhibited some degree of 
dependency with other firms. 
If the correlation suggested by Table I along with other sources 
of correlation existed and was significant, the statistics presented 
for the 177 individual matched pair differences may not be independent 
and interpretation of the joint distribution of the z statistics 
presented should be made with caution. Some may question the wisdom 
of even presenting the individual return data given the apparent strong 
possibility of dependencies among returns. The individual paired 
return data is presented in this study even though evidence indicates 
dependencies may exist in the data. Since the data under scrutiny 
consists of matched pair differences, the possibility exists that the 
differences themselves may be independent. The process of converting 
raw returns into return differences may tend to remove part or all of 
the dependencies between the individual returns themselves and may 
provide security return measures which are independent across firms. 
For example, assume that treatment firms A and B exhibited a high 
degree of dependencies. Also assume that control firms C and D were 
independent. The return differences obtained from the A-C pair may 
have been totally unrelated to the difference string obtained from 
the B-D pair. Sufficient doubt about the severity of the cross-
sectional correlation between the matched pair differences appeared 
to exist to justify the inclusion of the data and to justify the 
consideration of the joint distribution of the z statistics applicable 
to the data. 
Analysis of the Matched Pair Differences 
As noted above and in Chapter III, z statistics are presented for 
both the matched pair differences and for the portfolio differences. 
For the z statistic to be applicable, the underlying distribution of 
the difference in the security returns between the treatment and 
control samples must be approximately normal. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
(K-S) goodness of fit test was performed on the 100 nonevent week 
differences for each of the 177 matched pairs. The test was conducted 
using the Univariate procedure of the Statistical Analysis System 
computer package. The deciles of the distribution of the observed 
significance level (OSL) of the K-S test statistics are presented in 
Table III. 
TABLE III 
DECILES OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE OBSERVED SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL OF THE 
K-S D STATISTIC FOR THE 100 NONEVENT WEEK DIFFERENCE STREAMS 
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Deciles 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
OSL <.01 .022 .05 .10 >.15 >.15 >.15 >.15 >.15 >.15 
Examination of Table III reveals that for 50% of the difference 
streams, the null hypothesis of a normal distribution can not be 
rejected at a .15 level of significance. Another 10% of the matched 
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pair difference streams have an OSL of greater than .10 (the difference 
following the 40th decile has an OSL of .101). For the treatment-control 
matched pairs where the normality of the distribution of the 100 
nonevent week differences could not be rejected at the .10 level of 
significance, consideration of the levels of significance provided by 
the z tests may be appropriate. Therefore, the z statistics are 
presented in Table IV for the 105 matched treatment-control pairs 
where the normality of the underlying distribution could not be 
rejected at the .10 level of significance. 
For the remaining 40% of the matched pair difference streams (a 
total of 72), normality of the distribution of the 100 nonevent week 
differences was rejected at the .10 level of significance. For these 
72 treatment-control matched pairs, levels of significance based on 
the standard normal tables may be misstated. While not technically 
representing standard normal variables (i.e., the differences were not 
normally distributed), the calculated z statistics convey information 
concerning both the distance from the mean of the nonevent week 
differences of a single observation and on which side of the mean the 
observation lies. Therefore, the z statistics for the 72 matched 
pairs where the distribution of 100 nonevent week difference was 
rejected at the .10 significance level were combined with the z 
statistics for the other 105 matched pairs and the resulting 177 matched 
pair z statistics were presented in Table V. The z statistics were 
presented jointly in order to draw inferences based on the entire 
sample of matched pair differences. 
TABLE IV 
DISTRIBUTIONAL PROPERTIES OF THE Z STATISTICS FOR 
105 MATCHED PAIRS WITH INDICATED NORMAL 
NONEVENT WEEK DIFFERENCE STREAMS 
Deciles of the Distribution 
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10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 















DISTRIBUTIONAL PROPERTIES OF 177 MATCHED PAIR Z STATISTICS 
Deciles of the Distribution 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 








70% 80% 90% 100% 







Recall that the portfolios' difference in the event week was 
expected to be above the mean difference during the nonevent weeks 
(seep. 40). To imply support for the hypothesized return reaction, 
the calculated z value must be positive. Examination of Table IV 
reveals little support for the hypothesized security return reaction. 
The univariate critical value for the .05 significance level for the 
z statistic is approximately 1.645. Examination of the list of extreme 
values reveals that only 3 of the z statistics (2.9%) were greater 
than this critical value. The critical value for an OSL of .10 is 
approximately 1.282. Table IV indicates that no more than 10% of 
the calculated z statistics exceeded this critical value. Moreover, 
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the median z statistic of -.261 was consistent with the null hypothesis. 
The data in Table V is based on the full 177 matched pairs. The 
results reported in Table V appear consistent with those reported in 
Table IV. The median z statistic was less than zero, which implies 
no support for the hypothesized return reaction. 
Although the data in Table IV and V provide very little support 
for the hypothesized return reaction, care must be taken in placing 
reliance on this data. The assumption of normality of the distribution 
of the nonevent week differences was not rejected in the instances 
where significance levels of the z statistics were reported. However, 
normality of the distribution is only one precondition for placing 
reliance on the joint distribution of the z statistics reported. 
Independence among the observations is also assumed and is of vital 
importance when making inferences based on the joint distribution of 
the z statistics. As noted previously, the question of independence 
among observed returns remains unanswered. Therefore, implications 
drawn based on the z statistics reported in Table IV and V should be 
viewed with some.skepticism. 
The data reported in Table V however does serve the purpose of 
assessing the likelihood that a small number of large observations 
SS 
may have unduly influenced the results of the portfolio test presented 
in the following section. The mean z statistic for the full 177 matched 
pairs was -.223. Table V lists the S largest and the S smallest z 
statistics. These 10 observations were deleted from the sample and 
the mean z statistic was recomputed. Deleting these 10 observations 
caused an increase of .003 in the mean z statistic. Such a small shift 
in the value of the mean z statistic indicated that there was a small 
likelihood that the 10 extreme z statistics had a strong influence on 
the portfolio test reported in the following section. This procecure 
was repeated deleting the 10 largest and 10 smallest values with 
similar results. The examination of the data in Table V did not 
provide an indication of significant outliers among the z statistics. 
The result of the portfolio test presented in the following section 
can be interpreted as being based upon a general return movement and 
not the result of a few large.outliers. 
Analysis of Portfolio Differences 
In addition to the K-S tests that were calculated for the 100 
nonevent week differences for each of the 177 matched pairs, the K-S 
test was performed on the 100 nonevent week differences for the 
overall portfolio. Normality of the underlying distribution could 
not be rejected at the .lS level of significance. This was as expected 
since each portfolio difference was the mean value of the 177 paired 
differences for the given week in question. Even though a large number 
of the individual difference streams were found to be other than 
normally distributed, the central limit theorem states that the mean 
values would tend to be normally distributed. The result of the K-S. 
test at the portfolio level was therefore consistent with the central 
limit theorem. 
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The result of the z test at the portfolio level was consistent with 
the results obtained from analysis of the matched pair data. A positive 
z statistic would have been consistent with the hypothesized security 
return reaction. The large negative z statistic obtained provides 
evidence of a significant increase in the security returns of PMM client 
firms during the test period as compared to the security returns of 
the matched nonPMM client firms. Formally, the conclusion reached 
based upon the z test presented was that the null hypothesis of a 
smaller event week difference in portfolio returns could not be rejected. 
Even though the formal conclusion based on portfolio differences 
is failure to reject the null hypothesis, the strength of the OSL 
reported in Table VI implied that the portfolio of PMM client firms 
experienced a significant security return increase vis-a-vis the nonPMM 
client portfolio. This result was particularly interesting and led to 
an extended investigation into the return activities of each portfolio. 
The apparent increase of the PMM client portfolio return vis-a-vis 
the nonPMM client portfolio could have been due to a reduction of the 
return of the nonPMM client portfolio, an increase in the return of 
the PMM client portfolio, or a combination of both. To determine the 
source of the perceived return reaction, the event week return for 
each portfolio was compared to the mean return for each portfolio 
I 
calculated during the nonevent weeks. A z test was conducted on each 
portfolio return. The results are reported in Table VII. 
TABLE VI 
PORTFOLIO DIFFERENCE Z TEST 
Mean Difference (during nonevent weeks) 
Standard Deviation 









TREATMENT PORTFOLIO AND CONTROL PORTFOLIO Z TEST 
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Treatment Control 
Mean Return (during nonevent weeks) 
Standard Deviation 














effect of the SEC sanction ~n the control portfolio returns. Therefore, 
the OSL reported in Table VII were based on a two tailed test and 
represent the probability of obtaining a greater z value, sign ignored. 
The observed PMM portfolio return during the week of the July 2, 1975 
SEC sanction was opposite the hypothesized direction. The observed 
nonPMM portfolio return was slightly below the mean return for the 
nonPMM portfolio calculated during the nonevent weeks. However, 
neither portfolio event week return was significantly different from 
the mean nonevent return for each respective portfolio. 
One additional test was conducted to further examine the security 
return reaction of the PMM client portfolio. The MM was used to adjust 
the PMM client portfolio returns for the effects of market wide 
movements. S-W estimates of the parameters of the MM were calculated 
over the 100 matching weeks. These estimates were then used to 
calculate the estimated residual for.the PMM client portfolio over 
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the 100 nonevent weeks used for portfolio return difference calculations 
under the difference in returns methodology. The MM procedure converted 
the PMM client portfolio returns used in other tests herein reported 
into residual returns. The result was that the MM test was based on the 
same underlying data as that reported on in Table VII. Similar to the 
z test reported in Table VII, the event week residual return for the 
PMM client portfolio was compared to the mean residual return for the 
100 nonevent weeks. The results are reported in Table VIII. For a 
more detailed explanation of the methodology employed, see Chapter III, 
p. 41. 
The results reported in Table VIII were consistent with those 
reported in Table VII. The residual for the event week was in excess 
of the mean residual during nonevent weeks. However, the residual 
movement was not significant at the .5 level. To be consistent with 
Table VII, the OSL represented the probability of obtaining a greater 
.. 
z value, with the sign ignored. 
TABLE VIII 
TREATMENT PORTFOLIO RESIDUAL RETURN Z TEST 
Mean Residual (during nonevent weeks) 
Standard Deviation 








Neither the analysis of the individual portfolio returns nor 
the analysis of the residual returns of the PMM client portfolio 
provided any support for the hypothesized return reaction. Conclusions 
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drawn from the consideration of the results of the primary data analysis 
in conjunction with the supplementary data analysis herein reported 
are contained in Chapter V. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Conclusions 
Testing at both the individual matched pair level and the portfolio 
level provided consistent results. No evidence was discovered which 
implied support for the hypothesized security return reaction for the 
group of PMM firms investigated. The results obtained from the matched 
pair data should be viewed with the caveat in mind that the individual 
difference streams may not have been independent of one another. 
However, the consistency of the results between the two levels of 
analysis suggests that the results of the matched pair data analysis 
was representative of the general stock price reaction for the period 
examined. The primary conclusion drawn from this research was that 
SEC sanction did not lead to a decrease in the return of PMM client 
firms during the week surrounding the date of the sanction. 
The results of the supplementary investigation at the portfolio 
level provided evidence supporting the directional return reactions 
that were implied by the analysis of the portfolio differences. 
However, the individual supplementary tests themselves did not reveal 
a security return reaction that was significant at even the .5 level. 
As with the results of the primary difference analysis, the results 
of the supplementary investigation provided no support for the return 
reaction that was predicted using the agency theory framework. 
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The results of the difference analysis at the portfolio level 
implied a potential secondary conclusion. The secondary conclusion 
was that the security return of the PMM portfolio increased during the 
event week vis-a-vis the return of the nonPMM portfolio. The findings 
of a significant return increase were not supported by the results 
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of the other tests performed. However, the consideration of the joint 
movement of the treatment and control returns provided by the difference 
methodology included more information than did the supplementary tests. 
The assumption was made that the difference methodology provided tests 
which were better able to detect small return shifts. With respect 
to the analysis of the separate portfolio returns, this assumption 
was supported by an analysis of the magnitude of the variances of the 
security return metrics employed by the various tests. The difference 
in returns methodology and the residual return methodology were found 
to provide tests of equivalent strength. 
The variance of the portfolio level difference was 0.000031. The 
variance of the treatment and control portfolio returns were 0.0008044 
and 0.000872 respectively. The variance of the treatment portfolio 
residual was 0.000032. The test provided by the portfolio level 
difference was clearly stronger than the test provided by examining 
the separate portfolio returns themselves. However, the strength of 
the test of the differences in portfolio returns was approximately 
equal to the strength of the test provided by analysis of the treatment 
portfolio residual return. Given that these two tests were of equiva-
lent strength (as measured by the magnitude of the variances of the 
respective return metrics), the fact that the return difference test 
indicated a significant return movement while the residual analysis 
did not indicate a significant movement was attributed to a change in 
the relationship between the treatment and control portfolios during 
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the week of the sanction. If this change in relationships was due in 
part to a response to the SEC sanction, the test results imply that the 
prediction made using agency theory model was incorrect. If the changed 
relationship between the two portfolios was simply an indication of 
instability of the return generation process during this period, the 
test results imply little about the agency theory prediction. The 
stability of the relationship between the two portfolios was not 
specifically addressed in this study. 
The results of the tests conducted in this study were unclear as 
to whether or not a security return reaction occurred that was 
opposite to the prediction drawn from agency theory. The results of 
the test were clear in that no support for the agency theory prediction 
was found. Finding a lack of support for the hypothesized security 
return reaction was in and of itself not all that surprising. Recalling 
the presentation of the J-M agency theory model in Chap~er II, the 
hypothesized adjustment in firm value was thought to be a response to 
a change in the estimated amount of perquisites that can be taken by 
management. The amount of the obvious perquisites (such as plush 
offices, use of company assets for personal use, etc.) that can be 
taken by management may be trivial for a large company. Perquisites 
become nontrivial when shirking is included as a perquisite. However, 
if one considers the nature of the audit process, it is precisely the 
first class of perquisites which an audit is designed to uncover. 
The audit process usually consists of an evaluation of internal 
control followed by substantive testing. The purpose of the evaluation 
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of internal control is to assess the level of reliance that can be 
placed on the client's accounting pystem. This evaluation determines 
the level of substantive tests that need to be performed. The sub-
stantive tests.are designed to evaluate account balances. An examination 
of account balances is quite different from an evaluation of the level 
of management shirking. If the audit is designed to examine only the 
more obvious forms of perquisites and these perquisites are insignifi-
cant to a company, a change in the level of expected auditor 
performance would not necessarily be expected to result in a significant 
security return reaction. 
However, the implications of substandard audit performance may go 
much further than implications regarding management consumption of 
perquisites. The major concern would appear to be whether or not 
financial statements are materially misstated. Perquisites may provide 
management with incentives to falsify financial statements, but such 
perquisites may rarely lead to materially misstated financial statements. 
A greater incentive to falsify financial statements may come from 
management compensation schemes or from the desire of management simply 
to keep their jobs. 
The preceding discussion suggests that the quality of t~e audit 
performance should impact upon the market value of the firm. The 
results of the current research found no support for such a hypothesis. 
A possible implication of the current research is that no one single 
event relating to auditor performance is sufficient to significantly 
influence the market value of the auditor's client firms. This 
findings has implications with respect to the current agency theory 
model. In short, the hypothesized security return reaction to any 
one signal may not be significant and should not be considered a major 
motivational factor in explaining an auditor's or a manager's behavior. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
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The immediate extension of this particular research is to replicate 
the study using some other methodology. This would provide evidence 
indicating whether or not the results obtained in this study were an 
anomaly of the research design. Particular attention should be paid 
to the question of the stability of the treatment-control matching 
criteria. 
A secondary extension of this study would be to repeat the study 
using other signals which indicate a change in expected auditor perform-
ance. Should results of such a study indicate an increase in the 
security returns of the treatment firms, a reevaluation of the J-M 
agency theory and its underlying assumptions would be in order. 
A further extension would be to gather evidence of the perceived 
importance of the level of effort and quality of the auditor. Dopuch 
and Simunic (1979) reported that 89% to 99% of the corporate Chief 
Executive Officers or Presidents replied "yes" to the question "Do you 
consider it important that your stockholders be somewhat familiar with 
the name and reputation of your company's CPA firm?" An interesting 
study would be to compare management's perceptions with those of bank 
loan officers, investment analysts, and possible CPAs themselves. 
These participatns perceptions could then be compared to the role in 
which agency theory casts perceptions of auditor quality and 
performance. 
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